On the Freedom of the Will

Edwards

by Jonathan Edwards

PART IV

WHEREIN THE CHIEF GROUNDS OF THE REASONINGS OF ARMINIANS, IN SUPPORT AND DEFENSE OF THE AFOREMENTIONED NOTIONS OF LIBERTY, MORAL AGENCY, &c. AND AGAINST THE OPPOSITE DOCTRINE, ARE CONSIDERED.

Section I: The essence of the virtue and vice of dispositions of the heart, and acts of the will, lies not in their cause, but their nature.

Section II: The Falseness and Inconsistence of that Metaphysical Notion of Action and Agency Which Seems to be Generally Entertained by the Defenders of the Arminian Doctrine concerning Liberty, Moral Agency, &c

Section III: The Reasons Why Some Think It Contrary To Common Sense, To Suppose Those Things Which Are Necessary, To Be Worthy of Either Praise Or Blame.  

Section IV: It Is Agreeable To Common sense, And The Natural Notions of Mankind, To Suppose Moral Necessity To Be Consistent With Praise And Blame, Reward And Punishment.  

Section V: Concerning Those Objections, That This Scheme Of Necessity Renders All Means and Endeavours For The Avoiding Of Sin, Or The Obtaining Virtue And Holiness, Vain And To No Purpose; And That It makes Men No More Than Mere Machines In Affairs Of Morality And Religion  

Section VI: Concerning That Objection Against The Doctrine Which Has Been Maintained, That It Agrees With The Stoical Doctrine O Faith, And The Opinions of Mr. Hobbes.

Section VII: Concerning The Necessity Of The Divine Will

Text scanned and edited by Michael Bremmer

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